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WHEN MAY A SOVEREIGN BE HELD LIABLE
FOR THE ACTS OF HER INSTRUMENTALITIES
UNDER THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES
ACT? THE EFFECT OF THE MCKESSON DECISION
I.

INTRODUCTION

When are the acts of an instrumentality attributed to a sovereign under the
Federal Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)?' This topic has been addressed
numerous times in the U.S. court system, with the majority of cases refusing to
hold the sovereign responsible for the actions of her instrumentalities.2 The
thrust of those holdings found that the principal lacked the necessary degree of
control over the instrumentality to attribute liability. 3 One exception to these
holdings is Foremost-McKesson v. Islamic Republic of Iran (McKesson).4
This case note will focus on the District Court's recognition of the
necessary degree of control by Iran over her co-defendant entities. It will discuss
the exceptions of the FSIA and how they were applied in the instant case to hold
that Iran was attributable for her co-defendants. Finally, this note will examine
the potential problems that may arise from this decision, such as subjecting U.S.
parties and the United States to foreign jurisdiction.
The law today has changed significantly because of the ten-year journey of
the Iranian government, McKesson, and the instrumentalities involved in the
instant suit. When in suit with a foreign nation, plaintiffs have a much higher

1. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11 (1988) [hereinafter FSIA].
2. The FSIA prevents liability from being attributed to the sovereign unless the activity falls within an
exception to the FSIA. See generally Hester Int'l v. Nigeria, 879 F.2d 170, 181 (5th Cir. 1989); Hercaire Int'l
Inc. v. Argentina, 821 F.2d 559, 565 (1lth Cir. 1987); Baglab Ltd. v. Johnson Mathey Bankers, Ltd., 665 F.
Supp. 289, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Gregorian v. Izvestia, 871 F.2d 1515, 1530 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 991 (1999), Information Sys. & Networks Corp. v. United States, 994 F.2d 792, (Fed. Cir. 1993); Zemicek
v. Brown & Root, Inc., 826 F.2d 415, 419-20 (5th Cir. 1987); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chemical Bank,
782 F.2d 377, 378, 380 (2d Cir. 1986); Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790, 794-95 & nn.l-2 (2d Cir.
1984); Dayton v. Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, 672 F. Supp. 7, 10 (D.D.C. 1986), afTfd, 834 F.2d 203
(D.C. Cir. 1987); Arriba v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 962 F.2d 528 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 413 (1992).
3. There are several exceptions to sovereign immunity included in the FSIA. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1988).
4. No. 82-0220, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11792.
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burden, for they must prove a principal/agent relationship between the foreign
government and the alleged instrumentality. However, the standard for the
commercial activities exception of the FSIA has become easier to satisfy. These
issues will always be questions of fact for the court, thus allowing for highly
arbitrary rulings in order to satisfy the requirements.
A. ProceduralBackground
In November of 1979, a group of terrorists invaded the American Embassy
in Tehran, capturing United States' diplomatic personnel and holding them
hostage. President Carter responded to this act by declaring a national
emergency on November 14, 1979, and froze all interests of the government of
Iran and her instrumentalities.5 On January 19, 1981, President Carter entered
into an agreement negotiating the release of the American hostages in Tehran.6
This agreement is known as the Algiers Accords and consists of two parts. The
first section of the agreement negotiated the release of the hostages, while the
second created the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (Tribunal) to resolve
settlements between Iran and the United States.7 The Treaty authorized the
Tribunal to arbitrate any claims not settled within six months and to render "final
and binding" decisions "enforceable" in any court of any nation party to the
agreement.8
After an extremely lengthy procedural background, McKesson will be able
to have their claim resolved in a U.S. court. On remand from the D.C. Court of
Appeals, the U.S. District Court (Court) addressed the issue of whether the
government of Iran exercised the necessary degree of control over the other codefendants to create a principal/agent relationship so as to permit the Court to
deem Iran responsible for their actions.9 With the extremely factual determinative rule of law used to resolve this issue, it is not surprising that the Court
found there to be the necessary degree1 ° of control.
Foremost contended that Iran, acting through her instrumentalities, was
responsible for losses connected with McKesson's partial ownership interest in
Sherkat Sahami Labiniat Pasteurize Pak (Pak Dairy). The co-defendant
instrumentalities included (1) the Foundation for the Oppressed (Foundation), (2)
the Financial Organization for the Expansion of Ownership of Industrial Units
(Financial Organization), (3) the National Investment Company of Iran (NICI),
(4) the Industries and Mines Bank (IMB), and (5) the Pak Dairy.

5. Exec. Order No. 12,170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,279 (1979).
6. Algiers Accords, 20 I.L.M. 1017 (1981).
7. See JOHN A. WESTBERG, INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS AND CLAIMS INVOLVING GOVERNMENT
PARTIES: CASE LAW OF THE IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 4, n.3 (1991).
See R.H. Berglin, Treaty
Interpretation and the Impact of Contractual Choice of Forum Clauses on the Jurisdiction of International
Tribunals: The IranianForum-Clause Decisions of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, 21 TEX. INT'L L.J. 39, n.21
(1985).
8. WESTBERG, supra note 7, at 10.
9. Foremost-McKesson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 905 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1990) [hereinafter McKesson

Appeal].
10. Id.
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The original cause of action circulated among the Claims Tribunal and the
U.S. judicial system for over a decade. All of the parties still await a final
determination of liability. From 1959 through 1979, McKesson controlled the
top management and the board of directors of Pak Dairy." On January 22,2
1982, McKesson and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)
filed a complaint against the present defendants alleging that Iran, acting through
her co-defendant agencies and instrumentalities, illegally divested McKesson of
its equity interest. 3 The action was stayed while the parties, pursuant to the
executive order, 4 took their dispute to the Tribunal.' 5
The Tribunal concluded that the interference with McKesson's rights had
not amounted to an expropriation by January 19, 1981.16 However, the
Tribunal ruled that Pak Dairy illegally withheld $900,000 in cash dividends
declared in 1979 and 1980 and failed to deliver stock certificates representing
dividends and further breached certain contractual obligations."' Finding that
the Government of Iran had controlled Pak Dairy, the Tribunal awarded damages
plus interest against Iran."8
In April 1988, McKesson revived the original lawsuit seeking further
compensation for losses claimed beyond the Tribunal's cut-off date.' 9
McKesson was denied partial summary judgment against Iran on the issue of
liability.20 Upon an interlocutory appeal, the D.C. Court of Appeals remanded
on the issue of "whether the government of Iran exercised the necessary degree
of control over the defendants to create a principal/agent relationship and thus
permit [the] court to deem Iran responsible for their actions."" After an
actions, the Court found "the
extremely critical analysis of all
22 the co-defendants'
control.
of
degree
necessary
II.

CASE ANALYSIS

A. The Appellate Court Ruling
From the beginning, Iran claimed that it was immune from liability under
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976.23 Generally, a district court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction in a civil action against a foreign state or an

11.

Id. at 440-41.

12. Overseas Private Investment Corporation [hereinafter OPIC] is an agency of the U.S. that insures
private overseas investment of U.S. nationals.
13. McKesson Appeal, 905 F.2d at 441.

14. Exec. Order No. 12,294, 46 Fed. Reg. 14,111 (1981).
15. McKesson Appeal. 905 F.2d at 441.

16. Id. See Foremost-Tehran, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 10 Iran-United States Claims Trib. Rep.
228, 250 (1986).
17. McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11792, at *2.
18. Id.
19. McKesson, LEXIS at *3,
20. Id.
21. McKesson Appeal, 905 F.2d at 445.
22. Id.
23. FSIA, supra note 1.
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instrumentality or agency of the foreign state.24 However, certain exceptions
to immunity do apply. These include: (1) the waiver of immunity, (2) property
expropriated in violation of international law, (3) commercial activities occurring
in the United States or causing a direct effect in this country, and (4) noncommercial torts occurring in the United States.25
However, McKesson sought to hold Iran indirectly responsible for the
actions of her co-defendants. Indirect liability is allowed under the FSIA
assuming certain criteria are met. 6 Yet, under the FSIA the acts of agencies
or instrumentalities are accorded a presumption of independent status.27 The
presumption of independent status can be overcome where "internationally
recognized equitable principals" command liability so as to avoid injustice.28
The presumption will be overcome where "a corporate entity is so extensively
' 29
controlled by its owner that a relationship of principal and agent is created.
This is a factual determination made by the court. The Court of Appeals held
that the findings of the Tribunal were insufficient to determine whether the
necessary principal/agent relationship had been found.3" The Appellate Court
ruled that the factors in determining majority control and shareholding used by
the Tribunal were relevant, although insufficient, under the FSIA presumption.3'
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling that Iran lacked
sovereign immunity under the third exception to the FSIA.32 Under the third
exception, a sovereign lacks immunity for actions based "upon an act outside the
territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the
foreign state elsewhere . .. and that act causes a direct effect in the United
States. 33 In determining subject matter jurisdiction, the Court may only
consider acts that are commercial in nature and not those acts based upon a
sovereign activity.34 The actions alleged were not found to be governmental
but sufficiently commercial in nature so as to withstand Iran's motion to
dismiss.35
The Court determined that the evidence proposed by McKesson was largely
based upon conclusions of law concerning attribution from the Tribunal.36 This
would not be considered controlling upon the Court because the Algiers Accords
do not require the presumption of independence for agencies and instrumentali-

24. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a), 1603(a), 1605-07 (1988).
25. Id. See also Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989) (stating that
as long as service has been properly made and subject matter jurisdiction exists, personal jurisdiction under the
FSIA also exists). In the present case, the Court of Appeals found that Iran waived its objection of personal
jurisdiction, because the claim had never been raised before. 905 F.2d at 453.
26. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a)-(b).
27. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Commercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 626-27 (1983)
[hereinafter Bancec].
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. McKesson, LEXIS at *21.
31. Id.
32. Id. at *21-22.

33. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
34. McKesson Appeal, 905 F.2d at 450.

35. Id.
36. McKesson, LEXIS at *24.
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ties.37 Although the Tribunal's findings of attribution were not controlling on
the issue of whether there was a principal agent relationship, the Court stated that
the relevant evidence on the two distinct issues "may be largely coextensive."38

B. McKesson's Contentions
McKesson claimed that their submitted evidence established three central
points. First, anti-American policies were a central theme of the Iranian
government.39 Second, Iran authorized and required her instrumentalities to act
as agents of the government and Iran asserted sufficient control to ensure that the
agents would enforce the government's anti-American policies. 4' Third, the codefendant agencies and instrumentalities exercised their authority as Iran's agents
in the implementation of those anti-American policies at Pak Dairy by denying
shareholder benefits to McKesson for reasons unrelated to the interests of Pak
Dairy.4 ' Using the Tribunal findings and the evidence submitted by McKesson,
the Court found a principal/agent relationship existed between Iran and the codefendants.
1. Anti-American Policies
Regarding McKesson's first point, the Court had previously taken judicial
notice of the anti-American attitude prevalent in Iran at the time in question.42
McKesson offered statements of anti-American rhetoric and acts of the
government of Iran. This was evidenced by the Iranian Constitution of 1979,
demonstrating that anti-American policies were implemented through the
Government's control of Pak Dairy's board of directors.43 Iran argued that the
actions ,onhey part, the lyanian Costituaion, and edicts Weve soely in the 'realm
of sovereign activity and not relevant to the principal/agent question." The
Court summarily dismissed this contention because the Appellate Court had
already held that McKesson's cause of action could be maintained upon the

37. Id. at *25.
38. Id.
39. Id. at *26.
40. Id. at *26-27.
41. Id. at *27.
42. Id. at *28.
43. Id. The Iranian Constitution, adopted in 1979, states: (1) that the government "shall employ every
possible means to achieve" the prevention of foreign influence (Article 3), (2) that the economy of the Republic
shall be established to prevent foreign control of the national economy (Article 43), (3) that foreigners are
prohibited from establishing corporations and institutions in certain fields including commerce (Article 81). Id.
The court further quoted the Edict from the Revolutionary Prosecutor of August 9, 1980, which states: "that
no payments for rent, business income and dividends from companies can be made to individuals who have
left the country... [and] the transfer of stock or partnership shares in companies for such individuals" is not
authorized without the approval of the Revolutionary Prosecutor. Id.
44. Id. at *29. See also Gibbons v. Republic of Ireland, 532 F. Supp. 668, 672 (D.D.C. 1982) ("for
purposes of determining whether a sovereign should be held liable along with its inistrumentalities it is far more
relevant to determine whether the government officials acted in concert with employees of an instrumentality
than whether they seek the same ultimate objective").
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commercial activities exception. 4' Although the Appellate and District Court's
decisions did not address the issue, the failure to satisfy the commercial activities
exception could have been the critical failing point for McKesson's action. As
set out below, the ad hoc satisfaction of the "commercial activities" exception
will again salvage McKesson's action.
2. Was There A Principle/Agent Relationship?
McKesson's second contention was that Iran authorized and required her
instrumentalities to act as her agent and to enforce Iran's policy. The court
analyzed each of the co-defendant's roles and found a principal/agent relationship
existed between Iran and the co-defendants.
The Foundation for the Oppressed (Foundation) was the first co-defendant
the court found to have had a principal/agent relationship with Iran. The
Tribunal had previously determined that the Foundation was an entity controlled
by the Government of Iran for purposes of the Algiers Accords. 46 Iran argued
that under the FSIA, the Foundation was not within the definition of agency or
instrumentality because it was a financially independent, religious organization
that was not run by government officials.4 7 The Court disagreed, although it
still had to determine whether the Foundation was an "organ" of Iran. This
determination was also relevant to the question of whether a principal/agent
relationship existed. The creation of a principal/agent relationship has been
defined in many different ways. For example, the Restatement (Second) of
Agency, Section 1, Comment a (1958), defines the creation of the relationship
as "a result of conduct by two parties manifesting that one of them is willing for
the other to act for him subject to his control, and that the other consents so to
act." As set out below, the ad hoc rule handed down by the instant court is
similar to the Restatement view.
The Court found certain pieces of evidence as controlling on this issue. The
Foundation was established at the direction of the Ayatollah Imam Khomeini,
with the intent of confiscating royal properties and redistributing them to the
poor.4 9 The Foundation had the power to direct governmental institutions,

45. 905 F.2d at 450.
46. McKesson, LEXIS at *30. The Claims Tribunal adopted earlier findings that the Foundation was an
entity of Iran for the purposes of the Algiers Accords. See Foremost-Tehran, supra note 16, slip op. at 18
(citing Hyatt Int'l Corp. v. Iran, 9 Iran-United States Claims Trib. Rep. 72). Iran claimed that the Foundation,
under the FSIA, did not fit within the definition of agency or instrumentality. "[An agency or instrumentality
of a sovereign state means any entity- (1) vhich is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and (2)
which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and (3) which is neither a citizen of a state
of the United States as defined in section 1332(c) and (d) of this title, nor created under the laws of any third
country." 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(1).
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b).
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2). The District Court held that the Financial Organization falls within the FSIA
(28 U.S.C. § 1603 (b)(1) and (b)(3)), but because the Financial Organization did not own shares of Pak Dairy
it became a question of whether it was an "organ" of Iran under (b)(2) so that all three of the criteria of 28
U.S.C. § 1603(b) were satisfied. The court found that Financial Organization was an "organ" of Iran and a
principal/agent relationship existed.
49. McKesson, LEXIS at *13.
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including prosecutorial offices to carry out this intent.5 0 The Ayatollah
appointed the Prime Minister of Iran as director, whose supervision over the
Foundation served as the "supervision of the Iranian cabinet over the Foundation."'" In addition, the Foundation issued a statement in the official Iranian
newspaper that all companies in which the Foundation held rights were required
to disclose their company financial statements and were prohibited from
transferring any foreign shareholder payments without the consent of the
Foundation. 2 The Tribunal found that the Foundation held 9.5% of Pak
Dairy's shares. The Court found that the appointment of the Prime Minister as
director, along with the official notice and other pertinent information, evidenced
the fact that the Foundation was not only an "organ" of Iran, but was an agent
as well.53
The Financial Organization for the Expansion of Ownership of Industrial
Units (Financial Organization) was the second co-defendant that the Court found
to have a principal/agent relationship with Iran. Iran admitted that most of the
directors of the Financial Organization were made up of government ministers,
however, it was not an "agent" of Iran.54 The objective of the Financial
Organization was to expand the ownership of industrial industries in Iran to the
people.55 Iran supplied the capital for the organization and it was guided by
Iranian government regulations related to government-owned companies. 6

50. Id. at *31-32.
51. Id. at *33 (quoting Hyatt Int'l Corp., 9 Iran-United States Claims Trib. Rep. 72 (Westlaw Int. Library
Iran File, at 14-15)). Iran contended that the appointment of the Prime Minister was not an the official capacity,
and that the appointment by the Ayatollah was based upon the personal confidences of Mr. Mousavi, not his
position as Prime Minister. Iran supported this statement by the fact that Mr. Mousavi's successor was not
assigned the supremacy role over the Foundation. McKesson, LEXIS at *34. The District Court rejected this
argument, noting that Iran did not state how they knew the Ayatollah's reasoning for the appointment. Id.
52. The Notice was published in the Official Gazette, July 3, 1980. Id. at *35.
53. Id. at *34-35. Iran stated that the finding of the Foundation as an "organ" was in essence to "finding
the Baptist Church an instrumentality of the U.S. if President Clinton served on the board." Id. at *35-36.
However, in contradicting their position, Iran argued at the motion hearing that the religious powers of the
Ayatollah gave him power over the Foundation. Id. However the District Court disagreed with the holding of
the Claims Tribunal in Hyatt, where it was determined under the Accords that the Ayatollah's religious and
secular powers were not separable. Thus the exercise of "religious" authority was an exercise of "government"
authority. In discussion of the colorful analogy made by Iran concerning the Baptist Church, the court made
two important distinctions. First, the "Baptist Church cannot discover and seize property with the help of
prosecutorial and other agencies." Id. Second, the "Baptist Church has no authority to direct all companies,
whether nationalized or not, to comply with such a notice as" in the Official Gazette. Id.
54. Id. at *37.
55. Id.
56. Id. (citing the Financial Organization's Articles of Association #4, 18, 20). The Financial
Organization's Articles of Association show they are connected with the Ministry of Economic Affairs and
Finance, whose acting director serves on the General meeting. In Article 4 of the Articles, "the capital for the
organization is provided by and paid out of the State General income." Id. Any deficits in funding are paid
out by Iran under Article 18. Possibly most indicative of the principal/agent relationship was under Article 20.
The Financial Organization is "governed by Iranian Government regulations related to companies in cases
where the Articles of Association do not apply." Id. Due to this excess of evidence indicating the existence
of a principal/agent relationship, Iran did not seem to vigorously defend the lack of such a relationship.
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The Court discussed two letters that were mailed on government letterhead,
written by the managing director of the Financial Organization. The Tribunal
found that the Financial Organization, along with its member workers and
families, owned approximately 20.4% of Pak Dairy's shares and two seats on the
board of directors. 58 The Court found that a principal/agent relationship had
been established by the Articles of Association, the inferences raised by the
letters, and the findings of control by the Tribunal.59 As evidenced throughout
the opinion, the court was looking for any additional evidence, beyond the
finding of the Claims Tribunal, that would tend to show some governmental
control.
Iran conceded that the third co-defendant, the Industries and Mines Bank
(IMB), clearly was an agency or instrumentality of Iran within the meaning of
FSIA. 60 The Legal Bill on the Administration of the Bank's Affairs 61 was
enacted following the nationalization of all banks. This provided for the
governing authority of the IMB to be maintained within the High Council of the
Iranian Government. 62 The IMB incorporated the Legal Bill into its Articles
of Association. Additionally, the general authority of the bank, and most
supervisory roles were maintained by high government officials. 63 Ultimately
the IMB controlled 13.6% of Pak Dairy's shares and three seats on its board of
directors.' The Court found a principal/agent relationship.
Iran argued that the fourth co-defendant, the National Investment Company
of Iran (NICI), was not an agency nor an instrumentality because it was a jointstock corporation, with the majority owned by private citizens. 65 The Tribunal
found that NICI was a governmental agency under the Algiers Accords, because
the majority of its board members were dominated by directors of government-

57. The first letter directed to the Financial Organization stated that a previous meeting of its stockholders
had been illegal and improper. Id. at *38. The second letter directed another company to convene a general
meeting the following day to amend their Articles of Association. Id.
58. Id. at *39.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. In June 1979, with the passage of the Law of Nationalization of Banks, the government of Iran
controlled the management of the banks of Iran. After the nationalization, the Legal Bill on the Administration
of the Banks Affairs was enacted by Iran. Under this bill, the governing authority of the banks was vested in
the general meeting of the High Council. Id. at *40. The General Meeting is composed of government officials
and is convened and presided over by the Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs. "The duties of the
general meeting include approval of the balance sheet and budget, appointment of the board of directors of the
banks as proposed by the High Council, appointment of the managers of the banks and legal auditors," and
approval of the innerworkings of the banks. Id. The High Council is composed of eight members. Six are
representatives of government officials including one from the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs. The
remaining members are the president of the Central Bank of Iran, and the Director General of Banke Milli Iran.
Id. at *40-41. The High Council duties include making policy decisions concerning the regulations of the
banks, submitting these decisions for final approval by the General Meeting and development of the banks in
"accordance with the Islamic principles." Id. at *41.
62. Id.
63. Id. at *40.
64. Id. at *42. In 1972, IMB took over the National Iranian Banks Investment Company [hereinafter
NIBIC], which controlled 10% of Pak Dairy shares. The Claims Tribunal found with NIBIC, IMB held 13.6%
of Pak Dairy shares by November 1980, and controlled three seats on the board. Id.
65. Id. at *43.
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owned companies.' Again, the Court had to make a determination upon FSIA
standards. McKesson contended that Article I of NICI's Articles of Association established that NICI's goal was to further the expansion of industrial
ownership under governmental supervision.67 The Claims Tribunal had found
that NICI held 8.3% of Pak Dairy's stock. 68 The Court found a principal/agent
relationship existed.
The last of the co-defendants was Pak Dairy itself. The Tribunal found that
in total the other co-defendants, i.e. government-controlled entities, controlled
fifty-two percent of Pak Dairy's shares and seven seats on its board of
directors.69 Iran argued that the computation of these percentages was incorrect,
using their previous arguments for the other co-defendants. The Court
reaffirmed its previous discussion and concluded that Pak Dairy was therefore
an agency or instrumentality under the FSIA. 70 However, a further determination of whether Iran's co-defendants were acting as agents of Iran in controlling
Pak Dairy was required to determine whether there was a principal/agent
relationship between Iran and Pak Dairy.7
3. Were the co-defendants acting as agents of Iran?
The Court had previously determined that on the face of McKesson's
complaint, the allegations would amount to the necessary degree of control to
attribute the actions of the co-defendants to Iran.72 However, the issue was not
the same as in the present case. On remand from the Court of Appeals, the
District Court specifically described certain pieces of evidence that supported the
finding of a principal/agent relationship among the co-defendants and the
government of Iran. This evidence, in addition to the findings of "control" by
the Tribunal, supported the finding of the required relationship. There were three
primary actions on the part of the co-defendants that supported this finding: (1)
the activities on the board of directors and at the shareholder's meetings of Pak
Dairy; (2) the discussions concerning the payment of dividends; and (3) the
composition of the board of directors of Pak Dairy.
The Court found the activities on the board of directors and at the
shareholders meetings of Pak Dairy highly persuasive. In October of 1979, two
66. Id.
67. Id. Under Article I1, NICI is "structured to implement the government's economic agenda by
furthering the expansion of industrial ownership and thereby 'distribute wealth and income between citizens
of Iran more appropriately... and to reduce the risks of central ownership in one company."' Id. at *43-44.
Therefore Foremost contended NICI's economic role, with government supervision and the fact that the
government owned and controlled the board of directors, established NICI as an agent of Iran. Id. at *44. In
their defense, Iran claimed that it did not control the Foundation or NICI. Without these companies, Iran did
not own a majority of shares or seats in Pak Dairy. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. The District Court found the Foundation and NICI were agencies/instrumentalities of Iran;
therefore, it adopted the Claims Tribunal's findings that Iran controlled 52% and held a majority Pak Dairy
Board of Director seats. Accordingly, Pak Dairy was an agency/instrumentality of Iran.
70. Id. at *45.
71. See Gibbons; 532 F.Supp. at 672 and supra note 44.
72. McKesson, LEXIS at *45-46. See McKesson, 1989 WL 44086, at 6, n.8 (D.D.C. Apr. 18,

1989)(mem.).
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representatives of the Financial Organization were elected to the board of directors, "beginning a period of overriding influence," of the Financial Organization
over other board members and the management of the dairy. 73 Further, the
Financial Organization then called a general shareholder meeting to amend Pak
Dairy's Articles of Association. 74 At the following month's board meeting, the
representatives wrote on the meeting's minutes that "all foreign contracts were
to be reconsidered and any payments made to foreign corporations were illegal."7 5 Additionally, the representatives declared that the board retained full
control over the managing director to determine and approve all financial
activities of Pak Dairy.76 The following month at a special meeting of the
board, the representatives restated to the managing director that no foreign
payments were to be made until the matter was approved by the board.77
Although relevant to show that these individuals exerted a high degree of control
over Pak Dairy, the Court did not truly examine the relationship between these
individuals' actions and their "parent" entities.
Second, the court found the discussions over the payment of dividends
revealed the government's control over Pak Dairy. 78 At the February 1980
meeting, representatives of the Financial Organization reaffirmed the position to
deny dividend payments, and stated that the Dairy was not a joint-stock
corporation and that "the profit of the people and government should also be
considered. ' 79 The following month, the question of dividends and payment of
profits was addressed.80 Again, representatives of the Financial Organization
stated that due to the existing disputes between the governments of Iran and the
United States, payments of profits to foreign shareholders was to be delayed.8
At the April 9, 1980 meeting over concerns that foreign shareholders would
attempt to withdraw funds from Iranian accounts abroad if any profit shares were
issued, a representative of the Financial Organization stated that the decision
would remain undecided until the board could seek guidance "from their
respective government heads to find a probable solution."8 2 As a result of the
preceding dispute, the chairman of Pak Dairy's board resigned. He was
concerned that no payments had been made since the revolution because foreign
payments were under government control and any payment to foreign sharehold-

73. McKesson, LEXIS at *47-48 (citing Foremost-Tehran, 10 Iran-United States Claims Trib. Rep. 228
(1986)).
74. McKesson, LEXIS at *48.
75. Id. at *48-49.
76. Id. at *49.
77. Id. at *49-50.
78. Id. at *50.
79. Id.
80. Id. at *51.
81. Id. The representatives of Financial Organization suggested the minimum regular profits should be
divided among the shareholders and the balance of profits should be placed in a reserve fund with no premium
shares to be issued. Id. They reasoned this was necessary because of the presence of foreigners as shareholders.
The board decided an 18% cash profit and 10% premium shares were rational because keeping profits
undivided would not deprive stockholders of their rights. Id.
82. Id. at *52.
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ers was against the governments' policy.8 3 At subsequent meetings stock was
issued; however, representatives of NICI declared that no payments were to be
made to foreign shareholders because of the prohibition." Although McKesson
requested their payments, they were refused and the managing director of the
Dairy was reminded that he was not allowed to answer any request for foreign
payments.8 5 Again, in order to satisfy the FSIA standard, the Court was
searching for the additional evidence of government control beyond the findings
of the Claims Tribunal. The delay of a decision to seek guidance from their
respective governmental heads was exactly the type of evidence that persuaded
the Court. However, one further category of acts finally clinched the deal.
The Court found the composition of the board of directors of Pak Dairy
highly persuasive of the existence of a principal/agent relationship. At the
October 1980 meeting, the shareholders voted to replace McKesson representatives with government representatives from the Foundation for the Oppressed, the
IMB, and NICI.8 6 At this meeting, the Financial Organization's representative
stated that the government representatives would work without compensation so
as to promote company freedom from foreign interests!" This purpose, stated
by the government representatives, gave the Court the final' 8 piece of additional
evidence needed to find the "necessary degree of control. 1
Although requested, McKesson never received any dividend payments,
annual reports, statements, or information from Pak Dairy. 89 The result of these
actions was the unlawful ousting of McKesson from their investment in Pak
Dairy. The Pak Dairy board of directors, which were controlled by the
government of Iran, used its majority control to illegally divest McKesson from
their control in Pak Dairy. The Pak Dairy board of directors created a climate
so hostile to McKesson as foreigners, that McKesson realized they would no
longer receive their rightful profits from their investment.

C. The Claim of Attribution
The Court discussed the claim of attribution for jurisdictional purposes and
the doctrine of the corporate entity. An incorporated entity is not to be regarded
as legally separate from its owners in all circumstances.' When the entity is

83. Id. at *53.
84. Id. at *54.
85. The response to McKesson's request stated that "due to decision and instruction of the board of
directors, Pak Dairy would not pay any money for any reason to foreign shareholders." Id. at *54,n.17.
86. Id. at *55.
87. Id.
88. McKesson Appeal, 905 F.2d at 438.
89. Id. at *58.
90. Id. See Bancec, 462 U.S. at 626-27 (whether a sovereign should be held accountable for the actions
of the instrumentality is determined by reference to the principles of international law and U.S. federal common
law). The House Report accompanying the FSIA also supports the presumption of separateness when viewed
in light of the policy considerations. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6628-29 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT]. The Supreme Court in Bancec declined to adhere
to the corporate form because doing so would have allowed the sovereign state to avoid liability on a counter-
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so extensively controlled by its owner that a principal/agent relationship is
created, then both parties may be held liable for the actions of the other.9 This
is especially true when allowing the corporate form will promote fraud or
injustice and would generally be against public policy. 92 McKesson argued that
to allow Iran to hide behind Pak Dairy's corporate form would be unjust and that
principles of international law supported the finding of a principal/agent relationship.93 Iran argued that the many cases decided under the FSIA had not found
attribution.94 At this point, the Court was reminded of the Bancec decision that
held there is "no mechanical formula for determining the circumstances under
which the normally separate juridical status of a government instrumentality is
This "reminder" supports the Court's rather arbitrary
to be disregarded."9'
findings throughout the decision. The Court concluded, rather summarily, that
the cases Iran proposed were factually distinct from the instant case and
McKesson's further evidence established the principal/agent relationship. 96
1. Evidence of the Principal/Agency Relationship
The Court next specifically outlined the evidence involving the Iranian
government and co-defendants that established the principal/agent relationship.
McKesson proposed that "the actions by Pak Dairy's board and shareholders
resulted in an expropriation culminating in either late 1981 or early 1982 and
were taken in implementation of the declared policy of Iran to deny Americans
participation in the business and economic life of Iran." 97 First, the board had
extensive day-to-day involvement in the operations of Pak Dairy, including
retention of authority on virtually all important financial matters.98 Second,
there were many instances in which the Iranian government displayed an intent
that the board members could act for the government. 99 The Court was
impressed not only by the delay of the shareholders meeting so that board
members could "confer" with their respective government heads, but also with
the letters written on government letterhead.) ° The Court further relied on
equitable concerns in that: (1) McKesson would unlikely have a remedy against
the instrumentalities in the United States because of the probable inability of
establishing personal jurisdiction; and (2) the unlikelihood of a remedy in the
claim while it sought relief itself in the U.S. courts. McKesson, LEXIS at *59.
91. Id. at *58.
92. Bancec, 462 U.S. at 630.
93. McKesson, LEXIS at *60.
94. McKesson, LEXIS at *60. Cases refused to decide attribution based solely on majority control of
board of directors and majority ownership of stock. Id.
95. Id. at *65 (quoting Bancec, 462 U.S. at 633).
96. McKesson, LEXIS at *66.
97. Id.
98. Id. See Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. Provisional Military, 616 F. Supp. 660, 666 (W.D. Mich.
1985)(by appointing the majority of the board of directors and requiring that all checks in excess of a certain
amount had to be signed by one of the government directors, the government exercised direct control over the
company). The board decided that Pak Dairy would not pay foreign investors, including McKesson which held
a minority of shares and seats on the board. McKesson, LEXIS at *67.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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Although these acts are highly convincing of a
Iranian legal system.''
principal/agent relationship, the Court was able to use rather arbitrary factual
findings in order to establish the requisite "additional evidence."
2. Commercial Activities and Direct Effects
The Court next addressed the commercial activity and direct effects issue.
The Court of Appeals had found that the allegations by McKesson were
sufficiently commercial in nature to withstand Iran's motion to dismiss,'
Further, the evidence presented sufficiently direct effects, which were "foreseeable, substantial and direct," so as to confer subject matter jurisdiction.'0 3 Iran
argued that the previous test had changed and had been specifically rejected.t°4
The Court determined that the Court of Appeals decision to confer subject matter
jurisdiction based on direct effects had not been overruled because the facts of
Weltover were distinct from the instant case. 5 The Court stated that the6
evidence fully supported the finding of direct effect in the United States.10
There had been many contacts broken by the wrongful acts including flow of
capital, management, data, and machinery between the U.S. and Iran. 7 As
a direct and "immediate effect" of these wrongful acts by Pak Dairy, this flow

101. Id. at *68.
102. 905 F.2d at 451.
103. McKesson, LEXIS at *74. See McKesson Appeal, 905 F.2d at 449-50. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1605 there
are general exceptions to the jurisdictional immunity of a foreign state:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the
States in any case... (2) in which the action is based upon commercial activity carried on in the
United States by the foreign state. . . or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct
effect in the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) cl. 3.
On Appeal, Iran cited Zedan v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabi, 849 F.2d 1511 (D.C. Cir. 1988) which
established the direct-effects test. A "direct effect is one that is substantial and foreseeable." Id. at 1514.
104. McKesson, LEXIS at *74. Iran proposed that Republic of Argentina v. Weltover rejected the
"substantial and foreseeable" test in favor of the "immediate consequence" test. 112 S. Ct. 2160 (1992). The
District Court stated that Weltover did "not appear to have overruled the Court of Appeals' conclusion in
Foremost-McKessonthat the alleged effects of 'freezing out American corporations in their ownership of Pak
Dairy,' were at least as substantial as effects alleged in other cases." Id. at *75 (citing McKesson Appeal, 905
F.2d at 451).
105. In Weltover, 112 S.Ct. 2160 (1992), foreign plaintiffs sued for breach of contract. Argentina had
issued bonds which required payment of interest in U.S. currency, with payment to be made in cities including
some in the U.S. at the election of the creditor. In that case the court determined that under the FSIA
"commercial" exception, the defendant's actions were sufficiently commercial and direct in effect on the United
States, therefore the District Court had jurisdiction over the claim. Id. See International Housing Ltd. v. Rafidan
Bank Iraq, 893 F.2d 8, 11 (2d Cir. 1989)(no direct effect on the U.S. because the use of American equipment
and personnel in Iraq was incidental and there was no required payment in the U.S.); Martin v. Republic of
South Africa, 836 F.2d 91, 95 (2d Cir. 1987)(no direct effect in the U.S. because the American plaintiff after
being injured in South Africa, did not return to the U.S. for more than a year after the accident).
106. McKesson, LEXIS at *76.
107. Id. at *77.
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was stopped and necessarily felt in the U.S. 0 8 The Court found that McKesson had met its burden of asserting facts sufficient for the Court to find that a
principal/agent relationship existed between Iran and her co-defendants so as to
confer subject matter jurisdiction upon the Court over Iran for the acts of her
instrumentalities. "09

III. THE LAW TODAY

The FSIA, Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act, was enacted to codify U.S.
policy of facilitating domestic corporations or individuals when suing a foreign
government.1 Generally, foreign countries are considered immune from suit;
however, certain exceptions apply which are enumerated by the FSIA.' I
There were four primary reasons for the enactment of the FSIA. First,
Congress intended to enumerate when a sovereign could claim immunity from
suit within the U.S. under the general auspices of sovereign immunity." 2
Second, Congress was concerned with fostering foreign countries' confidence in
our judicial system, so sovereign immunity status is decided upon legal rules and
not political considerations." 3 Third, Congress was concerned with making a
procedural rule whereby courts would be able to maintain in personam jurisdiction, rather than forcing plaintiffs to seize property of the foreign state held
in the U.S. to ensure jurisdiction." 4 Finally, Congress wished to establish a
means whereby courts could enforce judgments against foreign defendant
governments." 5
There are few exceptions provided to the general rule of sovereign
immunity under the Act. These include waiver, the commercial activities
exception, the expropriation exception, and the tort exception." 6 In the present
action, the commercial activities exception was used. 7 Section 1605(a)(2)
provides that immunity will not apply in a case "inwhich the action is based
upon a commercial activity . ..outside the territory of the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act

108. 905 F.2d at 451. See Vermulen v. Renault, U.S.A., Inc., 985 F.2d 1534, 1545 (1 lth Cir. 1993)(Weltover indicated that the "direct effect" requirement of FSIA may be construed as incorporating the "minimum
contacts" test of the Due Process Clause); AMPAC Group, Inc. v. Republic of Honduras, 797 F. Supp. 973
(S.D. Fla. 1992)(where an American corporation alleged sufficiently direct effects where the breach of contract
caused substantial financial injury in the United States).
109. McKesson, LEXIS at *76.
110. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 90.

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.at9.
Id.at7.
Id.
Id.at 8.
Id.See also 28 U.S.C. § 1610(b) (1988).
2
3
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1),( ),( ),(5) (1988).
Id.§ 1605(a)(2).
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causes a direct effect in the United States."" 8 The standard is if the government is engaging in activity a private party could engage in, the activity is
considered commercial, not sovereign and immune." 9 The law has recently
changed regarding what constitutes a direct effect. 20 Prior to Weltover, in
the U.S., an injury's effect had to have been
order to have a direct effect 12in
"substantial and foreseeable. ' Today the previous test has been changed in
favor of the "immediate consequence" test.
The most significant rule of this case, however, dealt with defining the
presumption of independent status afforded to foreign governments in regard to
their instrumentalities. Initially, the District Court had concluded that the "issues
were the same, or at least very similar" to the ones presented at the Tribunal. 22
The Court originally allowed the requisite principal/agency relationship to be
shown by the Tribunal's findings of attribution based solely upon majority board
control and share ownership. 123 As discussed earlier, this was the primary
in light of the more
reason for remand to "make further factual determinations
' 24
rigorous ... standard required under the FSIA.'
The more stringent FSIA standard requires that entities are afforded a
presumption of independent status.1 25 This is overcome where the corporate
entity is so extensively controlled by the government that a principal/agent
relationship is created.' 26 The rationale for this rule displays some of the broad
policy considerations surrounding the enactment of the FSIA. 2 7 Congress
feared that the failure to recognize a presumption of separateness "might
encourage foreign jurisdictions to disregard the juridical divisions between
different U.S. corporations or between a U.S. corporation and its independent
subsidiary" and possibly subject the U.S. government to foreign court jurisdiction
more often. 128 Although the FSIA is a more stringent standard than that used
at the Tribunal, they both were trying to determine the same issue.
The essential difference between the two standards of the FSIA and the
Tribunal deals with the burden of proof. Both decisions dealt primarily with
trying to determine whether there was control by the government of Iran over
these specific entities. Under the Algiers Accords, used by the Tribunal, the
burden was upon the defendant to disprove government control.129 Under the
stricter standard of the FSIA, the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to
establish governmental control because of the initial presumption of separate-

118. Id.
119. See Rush-Presbyterian St. Luke's Medical Center v. Hellenic Republic, 877 F.2d 574 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 937 (1989).
120. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 112 S. Ct. 858 (1992).
121. Zedan v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 849 F.2d 1511 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
122. 905 F.2d at 445.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 446.
125. Bancec, 462 U.S. at 633-34.
126. Id.
127. HousE REPORT, supra note 90, at 29-30.
128. Id.
129. Foremost-Tehran,supra note 16, at 240-45.
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ness. 130 However, this seems to have a more equitable result under the FSIA.
Attribution is found if the government is truly guiding the entity upon a specific
course of activity, rather than looking solely at ownership controls.
There were specific areas of evidence that persuaded the Court that a
principallagent relationship had been satisfied so as to confer subject matter
jurisdiction under the FSIA. t 3' First, the Court was persuaded by the arguments regarding the disfavorable Iranian government policies against foreigners.
Second, many of the statements made by the board members concerning stock
payments to foreigners requiring governmental approval persuaded the Court.
Finally, the activities of the board of directors had a significant effect including:
(1) the extensive day-to-day involvement in the operations of Pak Dairy; (2) the
deference maintained by the board members to their respective government
heads; and (3) the letters written on government letterhead by the Foundation
representative.
The weakest point of the decision was the finding that the commercial
activities exception to the FSIA had been satisfied. Although not applied, the
change in the law from the "substantial and foreseeable effects" to the
1 32
"immediate consequences" test provides a highly lenient standard to satisfy.
This is true because any action will be based upon a claim that is arguably the
result of any "immediate consequence" felt in the United States. Although the
Appellate Court previously determined that the commercial activities exception
had been satisfied, the District Court reaffirmed this position, because there had
been the flow of capital, management, personnel, engineering equipment, and
data. None of the decisions, however, discussed the fact that this "flow" was to
Iran from the United States. 33 Numerous decisions have held that a financial
impact felt in this country alone is insufficient to satisfy the exception."
Although these decisions were decided under the old standard, if now considered
satisfied under the new test, the rule of law has clearly become too lenient.
In total, the law today has significantly changed because of the ten-year
journey of the Iranian government, Foremost-McKesson, and the instrumentalities
involved in the instant suit. Plaintiffs have a much higher burden in that they

130. See Letelier v. Chile, 748 F.2d 790, 795 (2d Cir. 1984).
131. See generally supra notes 76-100.
132. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. 1471 (1993), (Stevens, J., dissenting). Implying that caution must
be used in determining acts as "commercial activity," for by doing so the exception could "swallow" the
sovereign immunity defense Congress granted in the FSIA. Id. at *68. Thus the broad reading of exceptions
to FSIA could leave it powerless.
It appears that U.S. courts have started a trend toward finding the commercial activities exception satisfied.
Thus courts will reject the sovereign immunity defense and find the activity "commercial" in nature when the
sovereign not only regulates the market but also participates in it. Id. at *67.
133. Lisa Goekjian, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1311, 1346-47
(1991).
134. Id. See also Zedan v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 849 F.2d 1511 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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must show a principal/agent relationship between the foreign government and the
alleged instrumentality. However, the standard for the commercial activity
exception, under the FSIA, has become very lenient.
John J. Bowling
Jeff A. Cohen

